The introduction of a new method of electing the President of the European Commission in 2014, based on a specific interpretation of art. 17 of the TEU, has become a crucial event in the political life of the EU. In particular, the new method’s potential to strengthen democracy and the parliamentary nature of EU governance has been recognized. However, in reality, slightly different results have been produced. The Spitzenkandidaten mechanism turned out to be a formula based on immature solutions and electoral behavior and did not result in a clear reinforcement of the democratic factors of European integration. Instead, it has proved to be one of the expressions of inter-institutional rivalry, in which the intergovernmental European Council did not allow its competence for the appointment of the Head of the Commission to be diminished. The Commission itself, led by Jean-Claude Junker, in an attempt to exploit its „democratic” origins in 2014, has become more of a political than a managerial-administrative body. In 2019, the Spitzenkandidaten mechanism was not re-implemented, despite forced attempts of the European Parliament to do so. It seems that pragmatism has prevailed, with a clear goal – to protect one’s own prerogatives.